v. 1. Obrazovanie v sud'bakh narodov. Education in the fates of nations -- v. 2. Razdumyi︠a︡. Thoughts -- v. 3. Krutogori︠a︡mi zhizni. Steep roads of the life -- v. 4. Ėstetika i tvorchestvo. Aesthetics and creativity -- v. 5. T︠S︡ivilizat︠s︡ii︠a︡ v zhizni planety. The civilization in the life of our planet.

Книга предназначена для студентов, преподавателей и научных сотрудников высших учебных заведений, занимающихся вопросами философии.

In this article, cognitivism is understood as the view that the engine of human (individual and collective) action is the intentional, dispositional, or other mental capacities of the brain or the mind. Cognitivism has been criticized for considering the essence of human action to reside in its alleged source in mental processes at the expense of the social surroundings of the action, criticism that has often been inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy. This article explores the logical extent of the (...) critique of cognitivism, arguing that by positing collectively shared knowledge of criteria as the engine of human action many such critiques themselves display latent cognitivism. (shrink)

Here we outline a simple method of using two mirrors which allows one to stand outside oneself. This method demonstrates that registration of vision with touch and proprioception is crucial for the perception of the corporeal self. Our method may also allow the disassociation of taste from touch, proprioception, and movement.

In [GK], Gurevich and Kokorin proved that any two non-trivial ordered abelian groups (o-groups, for short) satisfy the same existential sentences. Let nowG, H be non-trivialo-groups with a commono-subgroupG 0. We determine whetherG andH are existentially equivalent overG 0. As a corollary, we obtain algebraic criteria for deciding, whether ano-subgroupG is existentially closed in ano-groupH. Corresponding results are proved foro-groups in which congruences are regarded as atomic relations.

Many interpreters of Plato's Laws have seen the introduction of the ‘nocturnal council’ towards the end of that dialogue as a return to the sort of philosophic dictatorship allegedly recommended in the Republic and thus as a betrayal of the principle of the rule of law evinced in most of the Laws. This paper defends the consistency of the council with the larger programme of the Laws by showing that its function is philosophic discussion and not rule. Its influence will (...) be the influence of philosophy on its members, who already occupy political offices in the city, and not direct rule as a body. In this way, the council provides a point of entry for the transpolitical good of philosophy into the city and thus offers an essentially legal regime the means of transcending some of its characteristic limitations. It also points to larger themes in Plato's political philosophy. (shrink)